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The Improbability of Positivism 
 
Andrew Tutt* 
 
Abstract 
 
Ronald Dworkin’s contributions to legal philosophy have 
been subject to severe criticism in recent years.1 Other legal 
philosophers call his arguments “deflected or discredited,”2 
laced with “philosophical confusions,”3 and “deeply embedded” 
mistakes.4 As Brian Leiter writes, “[t]he only good news in the 
story about Dworkin’s impact on law and philosophy is that 
most of the field declined to follow the Dworkinian path . . . .”5 
This Article endeavors to show that, far from an effort beset 
with primitive errors, Dworkin’s challenge to legal positivism in 
the opening pages of his seminal work was neither misguided 
nor trivial.6 Rather, Dworkin’s challenge remains as important 
and thought-provoking today as it was when he first set it 
 
* Visiting Fellow, Yale Law School Information Society Project; Law 
Clerk, Honorable Cornelia T.L. Pillard, U.S. Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia. The author would like to thank all of the editors of the PACE 
LAW REVIEW who helped to improve this Article, especially Jaclyn 
Weissgerber, Laura Young, and Karen Anzalone. 
1. See, e.g., JULES COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENSE OF A 
PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 67, 105 (2001); Brian Leiter, The 
End of Empire: Dworkin and Jurisprudence in the 21st Century, 36 RUTGERS 
L.J. 165, 166 (2004) [hereinafter Leiter, The End of Empire]; Brian Leiter, 
Beyond the Hart/Dworkin Debate: The Methodology Problem in 
Jurisprudence, 48 AM. J. JURIS. 17, 18 (2003) [hereinafter Leiter, Beyond the 
Hart/Dworkin Debate]; Dan Priel, The Place of Legitimacy in Legal Theory, 
57 MCGILL L.J. 1, 3 nn.1 & 2 (2011) (collecting criticisms). 
2. Brian Leiter, Explaining Theoretical Disagreement, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1215, 1216 (2009) [hereinafter Leiter, Explaining Theoretical Disagreement]; 
see also Brian Leiter, The Radicalism of Legal Positivism, 66 NAT'L LAW. 
GUILD REV. 165, 165 (2009) [hereinafter Leiter, The Radicalism of Legal 
Positivism] (“Ronald Dworkin . . . has made a career out of scandalous 
mischaracterizations of the positivist theory of law.”). 
3. COLEMAN, supra note 1, at 155. 
4. Id. at 181. 
5. Leiter, The End of Empire, supra note 1, at 166. 
6. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986) [hereinafter 
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE]. 
1
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down.7 His challenge, though straightforward, has never been 
satisfactorily answered. Rather than grapple with Dworkin’s 
argument, legal philosophers have either misunderstood or 
trivialized his insights in the decades since.8 But there is a 
reason H.L.A. Hart, one of Dworkin’s examiners at Oxford, 
saved his jurisprudence examination before ever having reason 
to believe that Dworkin would become the primary opponent to 
legal positivism.9 Hart’s challenge—the argument from 
theoretical disagreement—still burns bright nearly a quarter-
century on. 
Furthermore, this Article seeks to explain why legal 
positivism’s inability to preserve the face value of theoretical 
disagreement makes it improbable that legal positivism offers 
an adequate descriptive account of the nature of law. It also 
endeavors to outline why this deficiency is so immensely 
important. To accept the legitimacy of theoretical disagreement 
is accept that to know what the law is one must know something 
about the moral and political culture in which that law resides. 
 
I. Introduction 
 
A set of spelunkers are trapped in a cave, and to stave off 
starvation, one man is chosen to die so that the others may 
live.10 Dice choose the martyr.11 The man chosen objects, calling 
it “frightful” and “odious” to mark one for death by the most 
naked of chance.12 Nonetheless, upon his accession to the 
fairness of the throw, he is killed and consumed by his 
companions.13 The survivors are charged with the murder.14 
 
7. See Dale Smith, Theoretical Disagreement and the Semantic Sting, 30 
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 635, 636 (2010). 
8. See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 1, at 105; Leiter, Explaining 
Theoretical Disagreement, supra note 2, at 1215-16. 
9. See Adam Liptak, The Transcendent Lawyer, N.Y.U. L. SCH. MAG., 
Autumn 2005, at 15. 
10. Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. 
REV. 616, 616 (1949) (illustrating the improbability of positivism through a 
fictional hypothetical case and corresponding opinions by five fictional judges, 
each examining the case from a different legal principle). 
11. Id. at 617-18. 
12. Id. at 618. 
13. Id. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/2
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The statute reads, with no exceptions, “[w]hoever shall willfully 
take the life of another shall be punished by death.”15 
And yet, on appeal, the judges divide. They disagree about 
what the law requires.16 They do not disagree about what the 
law ought to be—all agree that a murder conviction and death 
for the survivors would be a tragic result—but some think the 
law mandates punishment,17 others forgiveness,18 others 
nothing at all.19 The judges do not disagree about the facts, the 
words of the statute, or all the cases that have come before; 
that is, they are not engaged in a factual or empirical dispute 
about what mutually agreed upon authoritative sources say.20 
They are instead engaged in what Ronald Dworkin famously 
called “theoretical disagreement.”21 They disagree about which 
sources they are meant to look to in determining what the law 
is. 
According to legal positivism this sort of disagreement is 
impossible.22 At most one—and possibly none—of the judges in 
 
14. Id. 
15. Id. at 619. 
16. See id. at 616-19 (Truepenny, C.J.) (holding the men guilty by 
arguing that the Chief Executive will surely issue them a pardon, thus 
allowing the judges to respect and uphold the law without guilty consciences 
for putting the defendants to death); Fuller, supra note 10, at 620-26 (Foster, 
J.) (holding that there is no law to apply, because the men were not within 
the jurisdiction of the realm at the time of the killing, and through arguing 
that they are emphatically not guilty by reason of necessity, their convictions 
should be set aside); id. at 626-31 (Tatting, J.) (holding that he cannot 
discover a single appropriate course for resolving the case—finding it 
intellectually unsound to excuse the men for murder, but evil to put them to 
death, and therefore recusing himself from the case); id. at 631-37 (Keen, J.) 
(holding that regardless of executive clemency, the words of the statute are 
unambiguous, thus resolving the matter irrespective of the court’s 
sympathies, and that it was inappropriate for Truepenny even to mention 
them); id. at 637-44 (Handy, J.) (arguing that this is clearly an extraordinary 
case, calling for an exercise of discretion and judgment by the court that is 
well outside the bounds of any case the law was ever intended to cover, and 
that it is quite simple to conclude that common sense and substantial justice 
favor a judicial declaration of the defendants’ innocence). 
17. Id. at 616-19 (Truepenny, C.J.); id. at 631-37 (Keen, J.). 
18. Fuller, supra note 10, at 620-26 (Foster, J.). 
19. Id. at 625-31 (Tatting, J.); id. at 637-44 (Handy, J.). 
20. See DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 5. 
21. Id. at 6. 
22. See Leiter, Explaining Theoretical Disagreement, supra note 2, at 
1216-20; Leiter, The Radicalism of Legal Positivism, supra note 2, at 167 
3
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the case of the Speluncean Explorers is correct about what the 
law requires.23 Any dispute about whether or not killing out of 
necessity is or is not the law is unintelligible in the absence of a 
convergent practice among officials establishing the criteria for 
definitively deciding this “proposition[] of law.”24 There may be 
no fixed practice, but in that case, there is no law to apply and 
judges must engage in the unavoidable exercise of discretion. 
To say otherwise is to make a primitive mistake about the 
nature of law itself. 
The disagreement on display in Lon Fuller’s famous 
hypothetical case—known commonly as “theoretical 
disagreement,”25 but also as disagreement about the “grounds 
of law,”26 disagreement about the criteria of legal validity, or 
disagreement about the “content” of the Rule of Recognition27—
is both recurrent in our legal discourse28 and defies Positivism’s 
most basic assumptions about the nature of that discourse.29 
For nearly three decades, Positivism has escaped without 
confronting the enormous challenge that the possibility of 
legitimate theoretical disagreement poses to the foundations of 
that theory.30 Professor Scott Shapiro recently called 
Positivism’s inability to satisfactorily account for the 
persistence of this kind of disagreement as “the most serious 
threat facing legal positivism at the beginning of the twenty-
 
(“[Positivism] claims only that when law exists in some society, we find a 
social rule that is the Rule of Recognition.”). 
23. See Kenneth Einar Himma, Substance and Method in Conceptual 
Jurisprudence and Legal Theory, 88 VA. L. REV. 1119, 1159 (2002). 
24. See DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 4 (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (“Let us call ‘propositions of law’ all the various statements 
and claims people make about what the law allows or prohibits or entitles 
them to have.”); see also Himma, supra note 22, at 1215-18. 
25. Smith, supra note 7, at 636. 
26. SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 285 (2011) [hereinafter SHAPIRO, 
LEGALITY]. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 283 (“pervasive”); id. at 291 (“a truism about legal practice”). 
29. Id. at 291-92 (“[L]egal positivism, at least as it is currently 
conceived, cannot make sense of this truism and hence is incapable of 
accounting for a central feature of legal practice.”). 
30. Scott J. Shapiro, The “Hart-Dworkin” Debate: A Short Guide for the 
Perplexed, in RONALD DWORKIN 22, 50 (Arthur Ripstein ed., 2007) [hereinafter 
Shapiro, The “Hart-Dworkin” Debate]. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/2
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first century.”31 Only one robust defense of legal Positivism has 
been marshaled, and it frankly and freely admits that for 
Positivism to survive, theoretical disagreements must be 
fundamentally misguided, incoherent, disingenuous, or 
unintelligible.32 
This Article seeks to explain why this notion is highly 
unconvincing, and why this seemingly minor defect in the 
foundations of Positivism—its inability to account for 
theoretical disagreements—makes it improbable that 
Positivism offers an adequate descriptive account of the nature 
of law. Not impossible, but unlikely. This Article also endeavors 
to outline why this deficiency is so immensely important. To 
accept the validity of theoretical disagreement is to accept that 
the very concept of law must incorporate deeper principles 
embedded in the moral and political culture in which that law 
resides, an outcome that threatens to tear down legal 
Positivism’s conceptual cathedral. 
Part II of this Article explains legal Positivism’s core claim 
about the existence and nature of the “Rule of Recognition,” 
and describes the puzzling persistence of disagreements that 
seem to flatly contradict Positivism’s most basic claims about 
it. Part III briefly explains unreconstructed legal Positivism’s 
contemporary answer to this critique.33 Part IV explains why 
these defenses require us to believe that there is widespread 
repetition of simple errors and rudimentary mistakes among 
some of the legal system’s most skillful and important actors—
an outcome that, while certainly possible, is highly improbable. 
The Article concludes with an explanation as to why the 
fall of the Rule of Recognition is so devastating to the Positivist 
program. Acceptance of the possibility of genuine theoretical 
disagreement means that what the law is at any given moment 
must be justified by the political morality that makes it 
 
31. Id. 
32. See Leiter, Explaining Theoretical Disagreement, supra note 2, at 
1215-18. 
33. See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994) 
[hereinafter HART, CONCEPT OF LAW]. “[U]nreconstructed” means either 
Hartian Positivism, as set forth in H.L.A. Hart’s masterwork, The Concept of 
Law, or the writings and views of legal philosophers who still ascribe to the 
core tenets of that theory but offer no alternative explanation or justification 
for the existence of this kind of disagreement. 
5
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legitimate. In other words, no proposition of law can be decided 
without potential recourse to its merits. Rather than content-
free and morally neutral, if theoretical disagreement exists, 
law is always subject to deliberation and its validity is always 
subject to its conformance with more basic principles of justice 
and political morality in the society of which it is a part. 
 
II. The Rule of Recognition and the Existence of “Theoretical 
Disagreement” 
 
Legal positivism aims to be descriptive and morally 
neutral.34 As an empirical and analytical theory, if it is to be 
judged, it is to be judged by the fit of its account with the 
institutions and social practices that create and enforce the 
law.35 For the most part it fits tremendously well. Positivism 
straightforwardly locates the foundations of legal authority,36 
explains how individuals predict legal consequences,37 draws 
clear and definite lines between what is and isn’t law, and 
illuminates why unjust and immoral laws can still be “law.”38 
Since these are all important aspects of the law as we observe 
it, Positivism gracefully explains the majority of our 
experience.39 
 
34. Andrei Marmor, Legal Positivism: Still Descriptive and Morally 
Neutral, in LAW IN THE AGE OF PLURALISM 125, 125 (2007); see Joseph Raz, 
Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law: A Partial Comparison, in 
HART’S POSTSCRIPT: ESSAYS ON THE POSTSCRIPT TO ‘THE CONCEPT OF LAW’ 1, 1 
(Jules Coleman ed., 2001); Frederick Schauer & Virginia J. Wise, Legal 
Positivism as Legal Information, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1080, 1088 (1997); see 
also HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 33, at 239. 
35. See Schauer & Wise, supra note 34, at 1082 (“[T]he truth or falsity of 
legal positivism has as its most substantial component a claim that is more 
empirical than conceptual.”). 
36. See, e.g., Scott J. Shapiro, On Hart’s Way Out, in HART’S POSTSCRIPT: 
ESSAYS ON THE POSTSCRIPT TO ‘THE CONCEPT OF LAW’ 149, 153-56 (Jules 
Coleman ed., 2001). 
37. See, e.g., id. at 187. See generally Scott J. Shapiro, The Bad Man and 
the Internal Point of View, in THE PATH OF THE LAW AND ITS INFLUENCE: THE 
LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 197, 200-04 (Steven J. Burton ed., 
2000). 
38. HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 33, at 207-12. 
39. See id. at 98-99; see also Scott J. Shapiro, What is the Rule of 
Recognition (and Does it Exist)?, in THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION 235, 242-45 (Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth Einar Himma eds., 
2009). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/2
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Legal positivism rests upon the “Rule of Recognition”40—a 
master norm, derivable from the practice of officials, dictating 
the criteria of legal validity.41 According to Positivism, the Rule 
of Recognition is the norm shared by the officials in a legal 
system that sets out the criteria for the validity of legal rules.42 
This norm is not itself a legal rule, but instead is a social 
convention, what H.L.A. Hart termed a “social rule.”43 The Rule 
of Recognition is the bedrock of a legal system, because it 
makes all other legal rules possible without needing to rely on 
other legal rules to ground its own authority (a problem that 
would lead to a significant chicken-egg paradox).44 
According to Positivists, the Rule of Recognition is 
constituted entirely and merely by the practice of officials in a 
legal system.45 As such, the Rule of Recognition is content 
free—it has no “necessary” nexus with morality, justice, or 
fairness.46 It is simply the label we use to describe the rule 
legal officials use to decide what they are obligated to do when 
deciding legal questions. It can therefore be determined 
empirically. In fact, it must be determined empirically.47 One 
resolves legal questions by looking to the Rule of Recognition to 
determine what the officials who apply the relevant law will do, 
because the Rule of Recognition is merely the description of 
what legal officials in a legal system feel themselves obliged to 
do as a matter of convergent social practice.48 
The account so far is quite straightforward, almost 
tautologically so. Looking to what judges and other officials in 
the legal system think they are obligated to do when faced with 
a particular set of facts giving rise to a legal question is pretty 
much exactly how most people—consciously and 
unconsciously—determine what the law is. There is only one 
 
40. See id.; HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 33, at 100; see also 
JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 146 (1999). 
41. HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 33, at 94-95. 
42. Id. at 106. 
43. Id. at 109. 
44. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY, supra note 26, at 84. 
45. See HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 33, at 91. 
46. See, e.g., Scott J. Shapiro, Was Inclusive Legal Positivism Founded 
on a Mistake?, 22 RATIO JURIS 326, 327 (2009). 
47. See SHAPIRO, LEGALITY, supra note 26, at 290-91. 
48. See HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 33, at 97. 
7
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problem with this account, which is that judges frequently 
disagree about what they are obligated to do.49 That is, judges 
persistently engage in what Ronald Dworkin called “theoretical 
disagreement about the grounds of law.”50 They disagree about 
the criteria of legal validity.51 
This is an important insight because according to 
Positivists, the Rule of Recognition provides the criteria for 
determining when something is against the law. To answer a 
question about what the law is, one looks to the Rule of 
Recognition and deduces the answer from it. There is no room, 
in legal Positivism, for anything more than superficial 
disagreement about what the law is. It might be unclear what 
the Rule of Recognition demands, but its content is not 
something that is open to debate because the very idea of 
debating the content of a norm derived from the practice of 
officials is incoherent—akin to debating whether gravity exists. 
Whether one believes or refuses to believe in it, gravity will 
continue to persist. Likewise, according to Positivists, whether 
one chooses to agree with or disagree with the content of the 
Rule of Recognition, it provides the criteria of legal validity. 
But this account falls short if we accept that it is possible 
to disagree about the very notion of what makes something the 
law. If one accepts the modest proposition that we might not all 
share the same ideas about what makes something “against 
the law”—that is, that we might legitimately disagree about 
the grounds of law itself without thereby giving up the claim 
that there can still be binding legal authority—it then becomes 
difficult to accept the notion that something is “law” only if it 
meets the test set forth in a Rule of Recognition. 
Theoretical disagreement poses an overwhelming 
challenge to legal Positivism because in hard cases giving rise 
to such disagreements, the traditional content- and value-free 
 
49. Many of these disagreements are interpretive and abstract, 
reflecting conflicts over what the Constitution commands judges to do, or 
what statutes require, when properly interpreted. See DWORKIN, LAW’S 
EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 16; see also SHAPIRO, LEGALITY, supra note 26, at 283 
(calling theoretical disagreement a kind of disagreement “legal reasoners 
frequently have . . .”). 
50. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 6. 
51. See Leiter, Explaining Theoretical Disagreement, supra note 2, at 
1217. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/2
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nature of the Rule of Recognition no longer sets the criteria of 
legal validity. Judges and lawyers continue to argue what the 
law is even though according to legal Positivism without the 
Rule of Recognition to guide them, this argument is incoherent. 
Yet, we observe theoretical disagreement constantly. 
Judges argue with each other as if there is law to apply,52 as if 
the Constitution commands that a non-marital father receive 
no parental rights, not as if it ought to command that53—even 
though there is no established convention upon which to 
draw.54 According to Positivism these judges are not applying 
law, they are making it up, because the panoptic Rule of 
Recognition is silent as to how these cases should come out.55 
Legal Positivists have responded to the rhetorical problem 
hard cases pose—wherein judges appear to strongly disagree 
about the validity and authoritativeness of competing sources, 
often in morally freighted terms—in two unsatisfying ways.56 
One school has taken the route of “exclusive” legal Positivism, 
and argues that the Rule of Recognition simply demands the 
application of extralegal norms in hard cases.57 In other words, 
these Positivists argue that judges can decide hard cases by 
looking to moral criteria, but when they do, they do not apply 
the law—they exercise discretion.58 A second school, “inclusive” 
 
52. See DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 37-43. 
53. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127-28 n.6 (1989). In 
Michael H., the Supreme Court famously sparred over the “generality,” with 
which legal principles should be incorporated into claims of constitutional 
liberty. Id. at 142. One side asserted that relevant historical traditions were 
those specifically relating to the rights of an adulterous natural father, and 
the other, into whether parenthood was an interest that had been historically 
protected, id. at 127-28 n.6. 
54. See DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 37. 
55. See id.; see also Leiter, Explaining Theoretical Disagreement, supra 
note 2, at 1223 (“They write as if there is a fact of the matter about what the 
law is, even though they disagree about the criteria that fix what the law 
is.”). 
56. See SHAPIRO, LEGALITY, supra note 26, at 289. For a compelling 
account of why one might call these rehabilitations “unsatisfying,” see 
generally RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 189-216 (2006) [hereinafter 
DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES] For the proposition that this is, indeed, how 
positivists respond, see SHAPIRO, LEGALITY supra note 26, at 289. 
57. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY, supra note 26, at 289. 
58. John Gardner, Legal Positivism: 5 1/2 Myths, 46 AM. J. JURIS. 199, 
201 (2001). 
9
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legal Positivists, argues that the Rule of Recognition can make 
recourse to morality part of the law, and as such judges are 
occasionally free to treat moral truths as legally relevant facts 
(for instance, in hard cases).59 These Positivists make the Rule 
of Recognition so abstract that the legal obligations judges 
adhere to fit into a set of expansive conventions (about as 
opaque and indeterminate, one imagines, as the kōans of 
equity).60 
On the one hand, to an exclusive legal Positivist, the 
judges in the case of the Speluncean explorers are engaged in a 
coherent argument over how to decide the case but not because 
the law dictates one answer or another. If the law dictated one 
answer or another, the judges would agree on it, and decide the 
case according to it. Rather than arguing over how to apply 
law, the judges in the case of the Sepluncean explorers are 
arguing over how to appropriately exercise their discretion 
where the law furnishes no answer. On the other hand, to an 
inclusive legal Positivist, the judges in the case of the 
Speluncean explorers might actually be arguing over the 
proper application of law, but if they are, they are engaged in 
an argument about empirical fact, not about law. The law is 
not really in dispute. The facts are. The judges in the case of 
the Speluncean explorers are engaged in a disagreement about 
how to properly apply the law to the moral facts before the 
court. 
Neither of these theories seems to match what the judges 
in the case of the Speluncean explorers actually say. One can 
easily see that they do not believe themselves to be engaged in 
disagreements of either of these kinds. Some of the judges seem 
to think the law squarely dictates the outcome of the case while 
others seem to think it does not dictate an answer of any kind. 
Some respond to the belief that there is no law to apply by 
contending that the very non-existence of law deprives them of 
the authority to act. Others believe it is a license to make a 
decision consistent with the dictates of justice. But the judges 
in the case do not see themselves as engaged in an argument 
about the exercise of discretion (some think the law clearly 
 
59.  SHAPIRO, LEGALITY, supra note 26, at 289 
60. Id. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/2
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dictates the outcome and there is no discretion), and they also 
do not see themselves as engaged purely in an argument about 
the proper application of the law to the facts (some think there 
is no law to apply and that the exercise of discretion is 
warranted). 
This is the problem theoretical disagreement poses to legal 
Positivism. Positivism can explain away why judges often seem 
to speak in the language of morality when arguing about law 
without giving up the claim that law and morals are separate. 
But Positivism lacks any similarly expedient means of 
dismissing systematic interpretive disagreements, such as the 
longstanding conflicts between Textualists and Purposivists.61 
Positivism cannot preserve the face value of disagreements 
about how to determine when a particular command or norm 
has the force of law—disagreements, that is, about what is 
authoritative and who has authority. Since these are not 
linguistic or semantic conflicts,62 and since both exclusive and 
inclusive legal positivists still ascribe to the “core” of legal 
Positivism—that the Rule of Recognition, established by the 
practice of officials, decides the criteria of legal validity—the 
very existence of longstanding, irreconcilable, and legally 
decisive interpretive disagreements is impossible unless one of 
the two sides of the debate in any case giving rise to theoretical 
disagreement is fundamentally wrong (the “Error” thesis) or 
one side is being disingenuous (the “Disingenuity” thesis).63 
The next section explains how contemporary Positivism has 
responded to this charge. It has been rather surprising. 
 
III. How Positivists Explain Theoretical Disagreement 
 
Unreconstructed Positivists who have confronted the 
problem of theoretical disagreement (most have overlooked it64) 
concede that there are only two explanations for the 
persistence of such disagreements in legal argument.65 Either 
legal reasoners who engage in theoretical disagreements are 
 
61. Id. 
62. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 37-43. 
63. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY, supra note 26, at 290-92. 
64. Shapiro, The “Hart-Dworkin” Debate, supra note 30, at 50. 
65. Leiter, Explaining Theoretical Disagreement, supra note 2, at 1223. 
11
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mistaken about the criteria of legal validity—that is, they are 
wrong, or in error66—or are aware of the proper criteria (or are 
aware that there exist no proper criteria) but nonetheless 
persist in making arguments as if there were binding law to 
apply—that is, they are being dishonest or disingenuous.67 
Nonetheless, Positivists hold, even though judges who 
argue about the proper approach to statutory interpretation or 
the proper way to interpret the Constitution are either in Error 
or being Disingenuous about what the law requires, this should 
not deeply concern us.68 Notwithstanding Ronald Dworkin’s 
vociferation that law “is not a grotesque joke”69 and Professor 
Scott Shapiro’s acclamation that if Positivists “wish to deny the 
existence of theoretical legal disagreements, they are forced to 
say that legal scholars are so confused about the practice they 
study that they routinely engage in incoherent 
argumentation”70—such disagreement is indeed impossible 
according to Positivists.71 Fortunately, they counter, both the 
Error and Disingenuity theses, though precisely what we see 
when we see so-called theoretical disagreements occur, are no 
big deal.72 
In support of the proposition that these disagreements are 
no big deal, they take two argumentative tacks. First, they 
contend that Error and Disingenuity are far likelier than one 
would initially suspect.73 Errors are a common occurrence in 
any sufficiently complex field.74 “Religious discourse is our 
paradigm case of an ongoing discourse that nonetheless invites 
Error Theoretic treatment, since its persistence 
(notwithstanding its systematic falsity) seems explicable by the 
powerful psychological satisfactions it affords sincere 
participants.”75 Likewise, Disingenuity is common to the 
 
66. Id. at 1224. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 1247-49. 
69. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 44. 
70. Shapiro, The “Hart-Dworkin” Debate, supra note 30, at 43. 
71. Leiter, Explaining Theoretical Disagreement, supra note 2, at 1223. 
72. See Smith, supra note 7, at 659. 
73. Id. 
74. Himma, supra note 23, at 1159; Leiter, Explaining Theoretical 
Disagreement, supra note 2, at 1225. 
75. Leiter, Explaining Theoretical Disagreement, supra note 2, at 1225-
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/2
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practice of professionals. Lawyers often use specialized 
language, terms, and rituals even though they are divorced 
from the meanings that might be ascribed to them by laymen.76 
Legal fictions are the paradigm case here. In law, terms of art, 
forms of action, and modes of proceeding are often treated 
idiosyncratically in order to effect outcomes that the legal 
system cannot fashion honestly.77 
Second, “[b]orrowing a bit loosely from the philosophical 
literature that examines the rationality of belief and theory 
choice in the sciences,”78 Positivists contend that because legal 
Positivism simply and elegantly explains an enormous range of 
our experience, it is likelier to be true than alternative 
accounts of the concept of law.79 Offering “three familiar 
theoretical desiderata often thought relevant” to deciding 
between competing theories in the sciences, they offer 
Positivism’s superior simplicity, consilience, and conservatism 
over competing accounts as another point in its favor.80 
The final section of this Article takes up each of these 
strands of argument and shows why they are deeply 
implausible. 
 
IV. The Improbability of Positivism 
 
This final section briefly outlines why the two accounts of 
theoretical disagreement offered by legal positivists—”the 
disingenuity and error are common” response and the 
“positivism better fits and justifies our concept of law” 
response—are both highly unlikely to save Positivism. 
At the outset, the “positivism better fits and justifies our 
concept of law” response to the problem of theoretical 
disagreement is a non-starter if accounting for theoretical 
disagreement is a necessary condition of any adequate account 
of the nature of law. There are, after all, an infinite number of 
possible explanatory accounts that we might proffer to explain 
 
26. 
76. Id. at 1238-39. 
77. See LON FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 9 (1967). 
78. Leiter, Explaining Theoretical Disagreement, supra note 2, at 1239. 
79. Id. at 1239. 
80. Id. at 1239-40. 
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the world and our experience in it.81 In choosing between them 
we first eliminate all those theories that simply categorically 
fail to account for necessary conditions—that is, that are false. 
Milton Friedman once offered the example of the rational, 
energy-density maximizing manner in which leaves seem to 
arrange themselves on trees.82 One hypothesis would be that 
the arrangement is volitional, another that it is the product of 
chance.83 The most reliable test for determining that these 
hypotheses do not hold, is to falsify them—to find systematic 
shortcomings that render these hypotheses highly improbable, 
if not impossible. If theoretical disagreement is possible, that 
fact alone would falsify Positivism, regardless of Positivism’s 
truthiness with respect to the remainder of our experience. 
This makes the argument that theoretical disagreement is 
erroneous because it is inconsistent with Positivism backward. 
Such an argument seems to hold that where reality and theory 
diverge it is reality that should give way. This cannot be right. 
Legal positivism has no a priori claim to being more correct 
than any other account of the nature of law, save that it fits our 
understanding of law better than other accounts have. But the 
argument that Positivism is a better theory than other theories 
because it better explains more of our experience of legal 
practice has no impact on the likely validity of theoretical 
disagreement. The supposed archetypical case—religious 
disagreement—exemplifies the point. When one’s baseline is 
atheism, religious discourse can come across as infected with 
primitive errors. But they are not logical errors. Indeed, the 
ordinary dictates of logic hold up just fine in theological 
disputes. The problem for the atheist who judges theological 
disputes resides in his belief in religion’s faulty premises. But 
since the premises of atheism are neither more nor less 
provable than those of (most) religious faith, it is impossible for 
atheists to make claims about the likelihood that debates are 
any more erroneous than debates about other phenomena, for 
 
81. Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS 
IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 1, 9 (1953). 
82. See id. at 12. 
83. Id. at 12-13. 
84. See Richard Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 
111 HARV. L. REV. 1637, 1653-54 (1998).  
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/2
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which no empirical evidence has yet been disclosed such as 
disputes about virtue, ethics, justice, and morals.84 
As to empirical evidence, the weight of observation is 
decidedly against Positivism. Indeed, the “error is common 
account” of theoretical disagreement suffers from the most 
elementary of problems, which is that it seems to call into 
question the very notion that one can argue meaningfully over 
what the law is, even though that seems to be all that judges 
do. Positivism declares that the only kinds of disputes about 
what the law is are either empirical or imaginary. That is, only 
two kinds of questions ever come before the Supreme Court: 
empirical disputes (i.e. “Given the evidence we have, was X in 
fact the law on this day”) and invitations to legislate dressed up 
as disputes over what the law is (i.e. “What should the law be 
when facts like these arise?”). By declaring these the only two 
kinds of disputes that can arise—even though none of the 
Questions Presented to the Supreme Court are ever fashioned 
in a manner that reflects either of these—Positivism must hold 
out that our judicial institutions, from the highest to the 
lowest, are fundamentally mistaken about what it is our 
society has instituted to them to do.85 
The argument that these observations are illusory because 
“disingenuity explains theoretical disagreement” is subject to 
the same critique.86 To argue that disingenuous, specialized or 
unartful language explains why we witness what looks like 
theoretical disagreement is just to reformulate the error 
argument in another guise.87 The Disingenuity account of 
theoretical disagreement differs only from the Error account in 
postulating that those who engage in theoretical disagreement 
realize it is a farce.88 That is, they are aware that the 
arguments they are making and responding to are not 
arguments about what the law is, but rather about what the 
law should be. But Dworkin, quite appropriately, maintained 
 
 
85. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically 
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”). 
86. See generally Leiter, Explaining Theoretical Disagreement, supra 
note 2. 
87. See generally id. 
88. See generally id. 
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that if legal officials were being disingenuous their opponents 
would say so, if only, at the very least, to undercut such 
arguments.89 Since they do not, it must be the case that they do 
not believe other judges are behaving disingenuously. The 
Positivist’s response to this is to bring up legal fictions, and 
argue that judges systematically conflate the is-ought 
distinction, but that they know deep down they are really 
making arguments about what the law ought to be, and that 
their statements should not be taken at face value.90 A better 
counterargument to the Disingenuity account, first voiced by 
Professor Scott Shapiro, is that if it were true, law professors, 
judges, lawyers, and pretty much every member of the legal 
system trained in the practice of law would know that these 
fictive theoretical disagreements were fictions.91 Legal fictions 
work because no one believes them.92 Legal fictions are not 
meant to deceive.93 They are the specialized language of a 
practice—much like mathematical symbols and biochemical 
charts are part of the specialized language of science.94 But 
ordinary lawyers, judges, and law professors are not 
systematically aware that judges are engaging in disingenuous 
theoretical disagreement.95 As such, the only explanation for 
their naïve credulity must be that they are fundamentally in 
error about the possibility of theoretical disagreement. 
The foregoing points taken together establish why 
 
89. See DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 37-38. Dworkin made a 
further argument, though one that is not quite as compelling: that judges 
often argue that a proposition of law must be decided in a certain way even 
though the judge personally deeply opposes that outcome. Id. at 38. The 
weakness in this argument lies in the fact that we already suspect the judge 
to be acting disingenuously in asserting this is what the law is even though 
he knows this is a lie. Nothing would better conceal this deception than a 
false expression that he disagrees with the result the law “requires” him to 
reach. 
90. Leiter, Explaining Theoretical Disagreement, supra note 2, at 1237. 
91. See generally id. 
92. FULLER, supra note 77 at 6. 
93. Id. 
94. For disingenuity accounts to truly hold, disingenuous theoretical 
arguments would have to possess the added dimension of a knowing intention 
to deceive, a relevant fact with which Positivists who have responded to the 
possibility of theoretical disagreement have not contended. See Leiter, 
Explaining Theoretical Disagreement, supra note 2, at 1238. 
95. See Shapiro, The “Hart-Dworkin” Debate, supra note 30, at 42-43. 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/2
  
578 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:2 
Positivism, as it is currently comprised, is so improbable. 
Recall that Positivists contend that theoretical disagreement is 
fundamentally in error or disingenuous because arguing about 
the criteria of legal validity is equivalent to arguing about some 
fixture of reality that is unaffected by deliberation—be it the 
nature of God, the velocity of light, or the existence of gravity. 
None of these phenomena can be changed by disagreements 
about them. Their existence, validity, and content are fixed by 
facts unaffected by belief. So too, according to Positivists, the 
criteria of legal validity are unaffected by disagreement about 
them. The law is fixed by the Rule of Recognition, whether 
judges think they can engage in disagreement about it or not. 
The Positivist’s claim is a simple one: disagreement about the 
content of the Rule of Recognition does not, because it cannot, 
change the content of the Rule of Recognition. 
But consider the analytical quandary legal Positivists have 
argued themselves into. They argue that the Rule of 
Recognition is fixed by the practice of officials in the legal 
system, but deny that a practice widely shared by those 
officials (theoretical disagreements) counts toward determining 
its content. 
Three possibilities flow from this apparent paradox. On the 
one, hand legal Positivism could be wrong about theoretical 
disagreement because theoretical disagreement can exist, and 
the account of the nature of law that Positivism offers is itself 
wrong or incomplete. What is and isn’t law is simply not 
decided by looking to a Rule of Recognition. This argument 
flips the Positivist’s contention on its head and argues that 
Positivists—who would require that the criteria of legal 
validity be fixed by a Rule of Recognition—are the ones who are 
fundamentally in error. If this is true, then theoretical 
disagreement is possible because Positivism simply fails to 
properly describe the universe (much like the theory of 
Phlogiston misdescribes the nature of reality). If this is so, then 
we must construct an entirely new account of the nature of law, 
one that validates theoretical disagreement. 
On the other hand, legal Positivism could be correct 
without emendation, in which case our concept of law can give 
no account of disagreements that appear to be systematic, 
17
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decisive, and widespread.96 
On the other hand, one might argue that legal Positivism 
is mostly correct but that a kind of “reconstructed” Positivism 
can account for theoretical disagreements. A not insignificant 
number of Positivists appear to take this view. They argue that 
theoretical disagreement can be brought within the Rule of 
Recognition unproblematically, and that therefore the 
argument from theoretical disagreement is trifling. Some 
appear to believe that Hart himself accounted for the 
possibility of theoretical disagreement by explaining that the 
content of the Rule of Recognition would be fixed more or less 
by accident—by each legal official creating it accidentally 
through her own attempts to identify its content and follow it. 
Superficially, a reconstructed Positivism that simply 
brings theoretical disagreement within the Rule of Recognition 
sounds enticing. The logic of a legal Positivism that gives way 
to theoretical disagreements is easy enough to grasp. After all, 
the core tenet of Positivism rests on the belief that an extra-
legal norm (the Rule of Recognition) establishes the legal 
obligations legal officials perceive themselves to have. If legal 
officials also believe that theoretical disagreements are a part 
of establishing their obligations, then theoretical disagreement 
must be possible. The very existence of theoretical 
disagreements that legal officials believe to be genuine would 
make it logically impossible for those disagreements to be 
erroneous, because these purportedly erroneous disagreements 
decide propositions of law.97 As such, part of the practice of 
looking to the Rule of Recognition would be recognizing that no 
one can perfectly identify its content, and to the degree that 
fuzziness in determining its content is accepted as part of the 
Rule of Recognition, the possibility of theoretical disagreement 
 
96. Moreover, there is no way to use legal rules to overcome interpretive 
conflicts because there is always a stage of interpretation at which the 
interpreter must decide for him or herself how to engage in proper 
interpretation of the initial legal command. See, e.g., Andrew Tutt, Comment, 
Interpretation Step Zero: A Limit on Methodology as “Law,” 122 YALE L.J. 
2055, 2057-58 (2013). 
97. One imagines this is why religious adherents persistently engage in 
their fundamentally “erroneous” discourse as well—if it results in converts to 
the faith, or creates a sense of religious obligation in a community, it seems 
odd to call it erroneous or impossible. 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/2
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would form part of the criteria for determining legal validity. In 
other words, whether theoretical disputes would otherwise 
fundamentally be in error is ultimately irrelevant if belief 
about the validity of such disputes were permitted to itself 
constitute an element of the Rule of Recognition. Then, 
whether the officials in a particular jurisdiction believe 
theoretical disagreements are possible is the only relevant 
means of deciding the validity of theoretical disagreements. 
But there is a serious circularity problem that arises if the 
Rule of Recognition itself allows for disagreement about its 
content. The Rule, as a Rule, becomes irrelevant. It becomes 
akin to a Rule that says “one may look to other Rules, none of 
which can be identified a priori, to decide propositions of law.” 
This is problematic because this kind of “Pickwickian 
positivism”98—that survives only by acceding to the belief 
among legal officials that theoretical disagreement is 
possible—is no different from a theory that rejects Positivism.99 
To see why, consider an argument between two judges over 
whether the law is X or Y. Suppose Official A is a Positivist, 
and insists that the criteria of legal validity are set by the 
practices of officials, and looking to the practices of officials, 
concludes that the law is X. In a version of Positivism that 
accepts the possibility of theoretical disagreement, this 
official’s views would only be one among many. Other officials, 
also Positivists one imagines, though it would not matter if 
they were not, could just insist that the Official A—along with 
a majority of other officials—had misidentified the content of 
the Rule of Recognition and that the law is actually Y. Official 
A’s only recourse to the argument that he has misidentified the 
content of the Rule of Recognition is to point out that the 
majority of officials agree with his view. At best, recourse to the 
practices of officials becomes one justification among many for 
saying the law is X instead of Y, but it is no better or worse 
than other justifications that one might proffer. The Rule 
ceases to be a Rule at all, because no one in any meaningful 
 
98. DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES, supra note 56, at 188-198 (noting that 
such Pickwickian Positivism robs Positivism of any of the special content that 
made Positivism’s unique descriptive account of the concept of law useful or 
theoretically interesting). 
99. Id. 
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sense “follows” it. It becomes a description of what officials do 
in fact, rather than a way of picking out which norms are 
legally valid. 
In Pickwickian Positivism, in other words, the Rule of 
Recognition, as a rule for recognizing which rules are legal 
rules, is no longer a way of recognizing anything. “Positivism” 
as a concept, loses all but the most pyrrhic meaning. Yes it 
could still describe the concept of law at its most threadbare 
and sterile, but its impact on our understanding of law would 
be negligible. The Positivist world would be indistinguishable 
from a world in which we took natural law or some other 
theory as the underlying method of determining the criteria of 
legal validity. One would never be able to tell whether officials 
actually followed a social rule in deciding propositions of law, 
because Positivism’s Rule of Recognition would never be 
identifiable, even if an overwhelming majority of officials took a 
particular view about its content. 
It is likely because they recognize this problem that 
unreconstructed Positivists adopt the view that Positivism 
cannot be squared with theoretical disagreement. Where 
theoretical disagreements arise, there is either no decisive law 
on the issue or at least one of the parties to the disagreement is 
simply wrong about the content of the Rule of Recognition. In 
this way, in unreconstructed legal Positivism theoretical 
disagreements do not contribute to the content of the Rule of 
Recognition. Rather, where theoretical disagreements arise, 
the Rule of Recognition is unaffected. There is either no law to 
apply because if there were, legal officials would use the Rule 
of Recognition to identify it, or, alternatively, one of the 
officials is wrong about the Rule because the practice of 
officials has already settled the question and the official 
engaging in theoretical disagreement is in error about it. 
But the extreme difficulty for the view espoused by 
unreconstructed legal Positivists is that the existence among 
even a subset of officials of a belief in the validity of theoretical 
disagreement on some issue effectively forces other officials to 
engage in theoretical disagreement about it, thereby unsettling 
the Rule of Recognition even if that subset of officials are in 
error. After all, insistence by even some officials that the 
criteria of legal validity should be (1), (2), (3) rather than (x), 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/2
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(y), (z) forces many or even all of the officials in the system to 
either engage in theoretical disagreement on the issue or give 
up the capacity for disagreement. This is because officials who 
strongly believe the criteria are (1), (2), (3) rather than (x), (y), 
(z) will render decisions on the basis of that belief, purporting 
to apply law even though there is no law to apply or they are in 
“error” about the criteria of legal validity. 
Positivism ends up in an even worse position than it was 
when it tried to become Pickwickian—engagement in 
theoretical disagreements by even a subset of officials kills the 
consensus necessary to create a meaningful social rule. Where 
some officials stubbornly insist on rejecting the settled practice 
of officials as a means of identifying the Rule of Recognition, 
the only recourse for the Positivist who wishes to counter these 
renegade officials is to justify recourse to the practice of 
officials as a means of determining the criteria of legal validity. 
That is, the only recourse is to justify Positivism.100 But to 
justify positivism is to engage in theoretical disagreement, 
thereby unsettling the Rule of Recognition.101 
What all of this means, ultimately, is that in 
unreconstructed Positivism’s account of the concept of law, 
officials who argue that the law dictates an outcome other than 
that accepted by the overwhelming majority of other legal 
officials, hold a veto power over the content of the Rule of 
Recognition. The minute these officials raise objections to the 
grounds of law relied upon by the majority of other legal 
officials, even if they are in the minority, what was once law 
dictated by a social rule becomes not-law, because into 
existence comes disagreement that forces theoretical 
disagreement that unsettles the social rule. For this reason, a 
Positivism that rejects theoretical disagreement is open to the 
charges that it either leaves the Rule of Recognition 
indeterminable or becomes a normative theory about how the 
criteria of legal validity should be identified rather than a 
descriptive theory about how they are in fact identified. 
 
100. We saw this in the example of the case of the Speluncean Explorers 
at the outset. See Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. 
REV. 739, 753 (1982) (arguing that Positivism is undermined by the very fact 
that those subject to its dictates require that it justify its claim to authority). 
101. See Smith, supra note 7, at 660. 
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There is an escape hatch available that would allow 
Positivism to survive intact. For Positivism to survive intact, 
we would need to be able to conclude that the vast majority of 
legal officials know that theoretical disagreement is fictive and 
ultimately hollow, even if they engage it. If legal officials 
secretly know the content of the Rule of Recognition, and then 
consciously deviate from it anyway, theoretical disagreement is 
truly disingenuous and there is no issue. Otherwise the Rule of 
Recognition is destined to be indeterminate because any 
disagreement about it unsettles it (unreconstructed Positivism) 
or irrelevant because disagreement about it is part of it in 
which case Positivism does no theoretical work and cannot tell 
us anything about what the criteria of legal validity are 
(Pickwickian Positivism). 
This is why Positivism is so improbable, because unless it 
is broadened to the point that it tells us nothing useful, 
theoretical disagreement unravels the idea that law is set by a 
social rule. As such, at its simplest, unless legal officials’ know 
theoretical disagreement is impossible, Positivism is either 
useless as a theory or collapses from within. This is why it is so 
improbable, and why the contemporary defenses of legal 
Positivism have thus far proven so unsatisfactory. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
The important question for the legal practitioner who cares 
little for parlor debates is inevitably “so what?” 
“So what if theoretical disagreement is possible?” he might 
ask himself, “What difference could it possibly make one way or 
the other?” The difference it makes is both trivial and 
profound. It is trivial because acknowledging the existence and 
validity of theoretical disagreement simply means that legal 
philosophers would be willing to accept what lawyers already 
know—that judges decide propositions of law by looking to 
principles, consequences, morals, and justice to decide what the 
law is.102 Judges do not simply look to a set of agreed-upon 
 
102. See DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 10 (“The plain-fact 
view is not. . . accepted by everyone. It is very popular among laymen and 
academic writers whose specialty is the philosophy of law. But it is rejected in 
the accounts thoughtful working lawyers and judges give of their work.”). 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/2
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criteria set by an all-seeing Rule of Recognition and then argue 
about whether or not those criteria are met in a particular 
case. 
The acceptance of the existence and possibility of 
theoretical disagreement is profound, however, insofar as it 
means that law is always subject to contestation on the merits 
both from within a legal system and from without. Two 
individuals can be subject to the same legal obligations—the 
same “law”—and yet properly see this law as valid and fixed for 
entirely different reasons and rationales. They see the same 
law, but also different law. Every legal case is an opportunity 
to call the law into question, and to require that legal officials 
justify its legitimacy and validity, even if the outcome is all but 
foreordained. The reason this is profound is because it imports 
an enormous faith into our legal discourse—a faith that no 
matter how insurmountably fixed or evil our “positive law” may 
seem, if it transgresses too far, it is not law.103 
More important than faith in the possibility of law, 
however, is the way that theoretical disagreement 
acknowledges that our legal discourse must demand more from 
judges, lawyers, and scholars than categorization games and 
debates over word-meanings. Theoretical disagreements mean 
that the very notion the law is or must only be that which is 
fixed by one set of criteria or another is subject to question in 
deciding propositions of law. Thus, the existence and validity of 
theoretical disagreement means that every theory of 
interpretation, from Originalism to Textualism, from living 
Constitutionalism to Purposivism, must justify itself to lay 
claim to fixing the criteria of legal validity.104 Unreconstructed 
 
103. See Somerset v. Stewart, [1772] 98 ENG. REP. 499, 510 (K.B.) 
(Mansfield, C.J.) (alteration in original) (“The state of slavery is of such a 
nature that it is incapable of being [legally] introduced [established] on [for] 
any reasons, moral or political, but only by positive [written] law, which 
preserves its force long after the reasons, occasions, and time itself from 
whence it was created, is erased from memory. It [slavery] is so odious [evil], 
that nothing can be suffered [allowed] to support [permit] it, but positive 
[written] law [allowing detention without due process (none existed)]. 
Whatever inconveniences, therefore, may follow from the decision, I cannot 
say this case [for slavery] is allowed or approved by the law of England; and 
therefore the black [slave James Somersett] must be discharged [free from 
slavery].”). 
104. See Fiss, supra note 100, at 753. (“Judges ardently committed to 
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Positivism holds that this is not only unnecessary and unwise, 
but impossible as well. The criteria of legal validity are fixed by 
the practice of officials, after all, and therefore, if a sufficient 
number of judges are Textualists, textualism is fixed by the 
Rule of Recognition. It is positive law. But if theoretical 
disagreement is possible, methodology itself must be discussed, 
debated, and contested—indeed, such contests cannot be 
avoided. And while this is an immense responsibility, if 
theoretical disagreement is possible, or even if legal officials 
merely believe that it is possible, then it is also unavoidable, 
though perhaps this might be a cause for hope rather than a 
reason to despair. 
 
 
legal positivism will ultimately be asked—as they were in the debates over 
the constitutionality of slavery before the Civil War and in response to the 
judicial efforts to protect industrial capitalism in the early part of the 
twentieth century—to justify the public morality embodied in that text and 
the processes by which those values are expressed.”). 
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